WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN
The 
European debt crisis has evolved rather quickly since my last  column, “
Greece is Bankrupt” (July 2). The European leadership was  clearly in denial. The crisis has lurched from one “scare” to another.  First, it was Greece, then Ireland, then Portugal; and then back to  Greece. On each occasion, European politicians muddled through,  dithering to buy time with half-baked solutions: more “kicking the can  down the road.” By last week, predictably, the crisis came home to  roost. Financial markets in desperation turned on Italy, the 
euro-zone's  third largest economy, with the biggest sovereign 
debt market in  Europe. It has 1.9 trillion euros of sovereign debt outstanding (120% of  its 
GDP), three times as much as Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined.
                                           Over the next two weeks the EU must  come up with a second Greek bailout which could be as high as  £107billion on top of the £98billion in rescue loans agreed for Greece  in May  The  situation has become just too serious, if contagion was allowed to  fully play out. It was a reality check; a time to act as it threatened  both 
European integration and the global recovery. So, on July 21, an  emergency summit of European leaders of the 17-nation euro-currency area  agreed to a second Greek bailout (Mark II), comprising two key  elements: (i) the debt exchange (holders of 135 billion euros in Greek  debt maturing up to 2020 will voluntarily accept new bonds of up to 15  to 30 years); and (ii) new loans of 109 billion euros (through its  bailout fund and the 
IMF). Overall, Greek debt would fall by 26 billion  euros from its total outstanding of 350 billion euros. No big deal  really.
Contagion: Italy and SpainBy mid-July, the  Greek debt drama had become a full-blown euro-zone crisis. Policy  makers' efforts to insulate other countries from a Greek default,  notably Italy and Spain, have failed. Markets panicked because of  disenchantment over sloppy European policy making. For the first time, I  think, investors became aware of the chains of contagion and are only  now beginning to really think about them.
The situation in Italy  is serious. At US$262bil, total sovereign claims by international banks  on Italy exceeded their combined sovereign exposures to Greece, Ireland,  Portugal and Spain, which totalled US$226bil. European banks account  for 90% of international banks' exposure to Italy and 84% of sovereign  exposure, with French & German banks being the most exposed. Italy  & Spain have together 6.3 trillion euros of public and private debt  between them. Reflecting growing market unease, the yield on Italy's  10-year government bonds had risen to 5.6% on July 20, and Spain's, to  6%, against 2.76% on German comparable bunds, the widest spread ever in  the euro era.
Italy and Spain face different challenges. Spain  has a high budget deficit (9.2% of GDP in 2010, down from 11.1% in 2009)  the target being to take it down to 6% in 2011 which assumes high  implementation risks. Its 
debt to GDP ratio (at 64% in 2011) is lower  than the average for the eurozone. The economy is only gradually  recovering, led by exports. But Spain suffers from chronic unemployment  (21%, with youth unemployment at 45%), weak productivity growth and a  dysfunctional labour market.
It must also restructure its savings  banks. Spain needs to continue with reforms; efforts to repair its  economy are far from complete and risks remain considerable. Italy has a  low budget deficit (4.6% of GDP) and hasn't had to prop-up its banks.  But its economy has barely expanded in a decade, and its debt to GDP  ratio of 119% in 2010 was second only to Greece. Italy suffers from  sluggish growth, weak productivity and falling competitiveness. Its  weaknesses reflect labour market rigidities and low efficiency. The main  downside risk comes from turmoil in the eurozone periphery.
Another  decade of stagnation also poses a major risk. But both Spain and Italy  are not insolvent unlike Greece. The economies are not growing and need  to be more competitive. The average maturity of their debt is a  reasonable six to seven years. But the psychological damage already done  to Europe's bond market cannot be readily undone.
The deal: Europeanisation of Greek debt The  new bailout deal soughts to ring-fence Greece by declaring “Greece is  in a uniquely grave situation in the eurozone. This is the reason why it  requires an exceptional solution,” implying it's not to be repeated.  Most don't believe it. But to its credit, the new deal cuts new ground  in addition to bringing-in much needed extra cash - 109 billion euros,  plus a contribution by private bondholders of up to 50 billion euros by  mid-2014. For the first time, the new framework included solvent  counterparties and adequate collateral. For investors, there is nothing  like having Europe as the new counterparty instead of Greece. This  europeanisation of the Greek debt lends some credibility to the  programme. Other new features include: (i) reduction in interest rates  to about 3.5% (4.5% to 5.8% now) and extension of maturities to 15 years  (from 7 years), to be also offered to Ireland and Portugal; (ii) the  
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), its rescue vehicle, will  be allowed to buy bonds in the secondary market, extend precautionary  credit lines before States are shut-out of credit markets, and lend to  help recapitalise banks; and (iii) buy collateral for use in the bond  exchange, where investors are given four options to accept new bonds  carrying differing risk profiles, worth less than their original  holdings.
The IIF (
Institute of International Finance), the  industry trade group that negotiated for the banks, insurance funds and  other investors, had estimated that one-half of the 135 billion euros to  be exchanged will be for new bonds at 20% discount, giving a savings of  13.5 billion euros off the Greek debt load. Of the 109 billion euros  from the new bailout (together with the IMF), 35 billion euros will be  used to buy collateral to serve as insurance against the new bonds in  exchange, while 20 billion euros will go to buy Greek debt at a discount  in the secondary market and then retiring it, giving another savings of  12.6 billion euros on the Greek debt stock.
Impact of defaultOnce  again, the evolving crisis was a step ahead of the politicians. There  are fears that Italy and Spain could trip into double-dip recession as  global growth falters, threatening the debt dynamics of both countries.  This time the IMF weighed in with serious talk of contagion with  widespread knock-on effects worldwide. Fear finally struck, forcing  Germany and France to act, this time more seriously. The first reaction  came from the credit rating agencies. Moody's downgraded Greece's rating  three notches deeper into junk territory: to 
Ca, its second-lowest (from 
Caa1), short of a straight default. Similarly, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's have cut Greece's rating to 
CCC.
They  have since downgraded it further. They are all expected to state Greece  is in default when it begins to exchange its bonds in August for new,  long-dated debt (up to 30 years) at a loss to investors (estimated at  21% of their bond holdings). The rating agencies would likely consider  this debt exchange a “credit event”, but only for a limited period, I  think. Greece's financial outlook thereafter will depend on whether the  country would likely recover or default again. History is unkind:  sovereigns that default often falters again.
What is also clear  now is the new bailout would not do much to reduce Greece's huge stock  of sovereign debt. At best, the fall in its debt stock will represent  12% of Greece's GDP. Over the medium term, Greece continues to face  solvency challenges. Its stock of debt will still be well in excess of  130% of GDP and will face significant implementation risks to financial  and economic reform. No doubt the latest bailout benefitted the entire  eurozone by containing near-term contagion risks, which otherwise would  engulf Europe. It did manage to provide for the time being, some  confidence to investors in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy that it's  not going to be a downward spiral. But the latest wave of post-bailout  warnings have reignited concerns of contagion risks and revived investor  caution.
Still, the bailout doesn't address the very core fiscal  problems across the eurozone. This is not a comprehensive solution. It  shifted additional risks towards contributing members with stronger  finances and their taxpayers as well as private investors, and reduces  incentives for governments to keep their fiscal affairs under strict  check. This worries the Germans as it weakens the foundation of currency  union based on fiscal self-discipline. Moreover, the EFSF now given  more authority to intervene pre-emptively before a state gets bankrupt,  didn't get more funds.
German backlash appears to be also  growing. While the market appears to be moving beyond solvency to  looking at potential threat to the eurozone as a whole, the elements  needed to fight systemic failure are not present. At best, the deal  reflected a courageous effort but fell short of addressing underlying  issues, leading to fears that Greece-like crisis situations could still  flare-up, spreading this time deep into the eurozone's core.
Growing painsThe  excitement of the bailout blanked out an even bigger challenge that  could further destabilise the eurozone sluggish growth. The July Markit  Purchasing Managers Index came in at 50.8, the lowest since August 2009  and close enough to the 50 mark that divides expansion from contraction.  And, way below the consensus forecast. Both manufacturing and services  slackened. Germany and France expanded at the slowest pace in two years  in the face of a eurozone that's displaying signs it is already  contracting. Looking ahead, earlier expectations of a 2H'11 pick-up now  remains doubtful.Lower GDP growth will require fiscal stimulus to fix,  at a time of growing fiscal consolidation which threatens a downward  spiral. At this time, the eurozone needs policies to restart growth,  especially around the periphery. Without growth, economic reform and  budget restraints only exacerbate political backlash and social  tensions. This makes it near impossible to restore debt sustainability.  Germany may have to delay its austerity programme without becoming a  fiscal drag. This trade-off between growth and austerity is real.
IMF  studies show that cutting a country's budget deficit by 3% points of  GDP would reduce real output growth by two percentage points and raise  the unemployment rate by one percentage point. History suggests growth  and austerity just do not mix. In practical terms, it is harder for  politicians to stimulate growth than cut debt.
Reform takes time  to yield results. And, markets are fickle. In the event the market  switches focus from high-debt to low-growth economies, a crisis can  easily evolve to enter a new phase one that could help businesses invest  and employ rather than a pre-mature swing of the fiscal axe. Timing is  critical. It now appears timely for the United States and Europe to  shift priorities. They can't just wait forever to rein in their debts.  Sure, they need credible plans over the medium term for deficit  reduction. More austerity now won't get growth going. The surest way to  build confidence is to get recovery onto a sustainable path only growth  can do that. Without it, the risk of a double-dip recession increases.  Latest warnings from the financial markets in Europe and Wall Street  send the same message: get your acts together and grow. This needs  statesmanship. The status quo is just not good enough anymore.
Former  banker Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British chartered  scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public  interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.