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Showing posts with label Greek. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek. Show all posts

Monday 21 May 2012

Debt crisis in Europe will affect rest of the world

The economic crisis in Europe is deepening and may get worse, with worrisome effects on the rest of the world.

Eurozone crisis: high-stakes gamble as David Cameron warns Greek voters.
David Cameron and European Commission president José Manuel Barroso talk before a session at the Nato summit in Chicago. Photograph: Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP

THE economic situation in Europe has worsened considerably in the past week, giving rise to a very worrisome situation.

The ramifications of a full-blown crisis are serious not only for Europe but also the rest of the world.

The recent Greek elections saw the citizens proclaiming their anger towards the austerity policies tied to the European-IMF bail-out package, by repudiating the two major parties and giving the small anti-austerity Syriza party second place.

The elections came in the midst of a greatly deteriorating condition. Greece has 22% unemployment, 50% youth unemployment, GNP is falling steeply, and public debt will remain high at 160% of GDP next year despite the recent bailout and debt-restructuring measures.

The leader of Syriza, Alexis Tsipras, who swept to the forefront of Greek politics on the wind of protest against the austerity measures imposed by creditors, wants to re-negotiate the terms of the bailout.

He thinks his insistence on this will eventually force the creditors to change the terms, with Greece remaining in the Eurozone.

But many analysts think that the response to this demand from the EU and IMF would be to stop further loans and force Greece to exit the Euro. In a second election in mid-June, Syriza is expected to do even better and a messy Greek loan default and Euro exit are now seen as more than just possible.

In a Eurozone exit, Greece would re-introduce a local currency, and after Greeks change from their Euros, a depreciation of the new currency is expected to happen.

News report indicate that some capital flight from Greece is already taking place, as Greeks fear that their present Euro-denominated assets would lose value after conversion to the local currency.

Meanwhile, Spain was last week desperately trying to avoid a run on banks after the government was forced to partly nationalise Bankia, the second largest bank, followed by rumours of such a run.

The value of bad loans held by the banking sector rose one third in the past year to 148 billion Euro and Moody’s downgraded the credit rating of many Spanish banks.

The Spanish finance minister Luis de Guindos said the battle for the Euro is going to be waged in Spain, implying his country is now in front in trying to prevent the Greek crisis from infecting other European countries and bringing down the Euro.

The spreading crisis throws into doubt the policies in most European countries that have in recent years focused on drastically cutting government spending to reduce the budget deficit in an attempt to pacify investors and enable a continued flow of loans.

This reversed the coordinated policy of fiscal reflation that the G20 leaders agreed on in 2009 to counter the global crisis. It contributed to the rapid recovery.

Since then economists and politicians alike have been debating the merits of Keynesian reflationary policies versus a resumption of IMF-type fiscal austerity.

The movement towards recession in Europe as a whole and deep falls in GNP in bail-out countries like Greece has boosted the arguments of the Keynesians.

But key leaders such as Angela Merkel of Germany and David Cameron of Britain are still convinced of the need to stick to austerity.

The victory of the new French President Francois Hollande and the stunning polls performance of the Syriza party in Greece indicate that the public wind has shifted radically against austerity, and that a change may be on the cards.

The stopping of loans to Greece would lead to an economic collapse, with government debt default, bank runs, re-denomination of local contracts to local currency and default on external contracts denominated in euro, in a scenario painted by Wolf.

A Greek exit could trigger bank runs and capital flight in Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain and beyond, causing collapse in asset prices and large GNP falls.



A decisive European response is needed, such as the European Central Bank providing unlimited loans to replace money taken out in bank runs, capping of interest rates on sovereign debt, Eurobonds and abandoning austerity-centred policies.

But if these policies are not taken, the Eurozone may disintegrate, with one study suggesting GNP falls on 7% to 13% in various countries, and if a full Eurozone break up takes place there could be a freeze in the financial system, a collapse in spending and trade, many lawsuits and Europe facing a situation of political limbo.

The impact on the world would be worse than the Lehman collapse. Though the implication is that this should not be allowed, a Greek exit would greatly increase the likelihood of these dangers.

If Greece leaves, the Eurozone will have to change fundamentally but if that is impossible, large crises will be repeated in a nightmare.

There would have to be a choice between a stronger union of European countries (which many do not like) or endless crises in future, or a break up now. No good choices exist, concludes Wolf.

The scenarios and predictions detailed above in the Wolf article are pessimistic, but may also be realistic not only because of the current economic situation, but also the apparent lack of conditions for a political solution.

Watching from the sidelines, with no ability to influence developments, many in the developing countries are disturbed by the turn of events. It will likely lead to a weakening of the global economy at best and a full blown crisis at worst, with the developing countries at the receiving end in terms of trade downturn, financial reverberations, and declining incomes and jobs.

It is apparent, once again, that a global forum should exist where all countries can discuss developments in the global economy and contribute their views on what needs to be done.

In the inter-connected world, policies and events in one part (especially in the core countries) affect all others.
 
 Global Trends By MARTIN KHOR

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Saturday 8 October 2011

Bleed the Foreigner!

Harold James


PRINCETON – Today, the world is threatened with a repeat of the 2008 financial meltdown – but on an even more cataclysmic scale. This time, the epicenter is in Europe, rather than the United States. And this time, the financial mechanisms involved are not highly complex structured financial products, but one of the oldest financial instruments in the world: government bonds.

While governments and central banks race frantically to find a solution, there is a profound psychological dynamic at work that stands in the way of an orderly debt workout: our aversion to recognizing obligations to strangers.

The impulse simply to cut the Gordian knot of debt by defaulting on it is much stronger when creditors are remote and unknown. In 2007-2008, it was homeowners who could not keep up with payments; now it is governments.

But, in both cases, the lender was distant and anonymous. American mortgages were no longer held at the local bank, but had been repackaged in esoteric financial instruments and sold around the world; likewise, Greek government debt is in large part owed to foreigners.

Because Spain and France defaulted so much in the early modern period, and because Greece, from the moment of its political birth in 1830, was a chronic or serial defaulter, some assume that national temperament somehow imbues countries with a proclivity to default. But that search for long historical continuity is facile, for it misses one of the key determinants of debt sustainability: the identity of the state’s creditor.

This variable makes an enormous difference in terms of whether debt will be regularly and promptly serviced. The frequent and spectacular early modern bankruptcies of the French and Spanish monarchies concerned for the most part debt owed to foreigners.

The sixteenth-century Habsburgs borrowed – at very high interest rates – from Florentine, Genovese, and Augsburg merchants. Ancien régime France developed a similar pattern, borrowing in Amsterdam or Geneva in order to fight wars against Spain in the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, and against Britain in the eighteenth.

The Netherlands and Britain, however followed a different path. They depended much less on foreign creditors than on domestic lenders. The Dutch model was exported to Britain in 1688, along with the political revolution that deposed the Catholic James II and put the Dutch Protestant William of Orange on the English throne.

Indeed, the Glorious Revolution enabled a revolution in finance. In particular, recognition of the rights of parliament – of a representative assembly – ensured that the agents of the creditor classes would have permanent control of the budgetary process.

They could thus guarantee – also on behalf of other creditors – that the state’s finances were solid, and that debts would be repaid. Constitutional monarchy limited the scope for wasteful spending on luxurious court life (as well as on military adventure) – the hallmark of early modern autocratic monarchy.



In short, the financial revolution of the modern world was built on a political order – which anteceded a full transition to universal democracy – in which the creditors formed the political class. That model was transferred to many other countries, and became the bedrock on which modern financial stability was built.

In the post-1945 period, government finance in rich industrial countries was also overwhelmingly national at first, and the assumptions of 1688 still held. Then something happened. With the liberalization of global financial markets that began in the 1970’s, foreign sources of credit became available. In the mid-1980’s, the US became a net debtor, relying increasingly on foreigners to finance its debt.

Europeans, too, followed this path. Part of the promise of the new push to European integration in the 1980’s was that it would make borrowing easier. In the 1990’s, the main attraction of monetary union for Italian and Spanish politicians was that the new currency would bring down interest rates and make foreign money available for cheap financing of government debt.

Until the late 1990’s and the advent of monetary union, most government debt in the European Union was domestically held: in 1998, foreigners held only one-fifth of sovereign debt.

That share climbed rapidly in the aftermath of the euro’s introduction. In 2008, on the eve of the financial crisis, three-quarters of Portuguese debt, half of Spanish and Greek debt, and more than 40% of Italian debt was held by foreigners.

When the foreign share of debt grows, so do the political incentives to impose the costs of that debt on foreigners. In the 1930’s, during and after the Great Depression, a strong feeling that the creditors were illegitimate and unethical bloodsuckers accompanied widespread default. Even US President Franklin Roosevelt jovially slapped his thigh when Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht told him that Nazi Germany would default on its external loans, including those owed to American banks, exclaiming, “Serves the Wall Street bankers right!” In Europe today, impatient Greeks have doubtless derived some encouragement from excoriations of bankers’ foolishness by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The economists’ commonplace that a monetary union demands a fiscal union is only part of a much deeper truth about debt and obligation: debt is rarely sustainable if there is not some sense of communal or collective responsibility. That is the mechanism that reduces the incentives to expropriate the creditor, and makes debt secure and cheap.

At the end of the day, a collective, burden-sharing Europe is the only way out of the current crisis. But that requires substantially greater centralization of political accountability and control than Europeans seem able to achieve today. And that is why many of them could be paying much more for credit tomorrow.
Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence. He is the author of The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle.