The Greek sovereign-debt crisis and the attempts of the European Union to quell the simmering pot before it boils over is commanding the attention of the international community.
The sovereign-debt problem isn’t in any sense the  end of the euro zone; not even the beginning of the end. The foreign-  exchange rate of the euro may fluctuate against other leading  currencies, as is to be expected in a floating-rate regime, but Greece  isn’t going to withdraw from the euro zone, nor is it likely to be  expelled by the other members.
Whatever the legal position, the view that  Greece, or any other country in the throes of recession, should withdraw  in order to benefit from devaluation of their currencies, is simply  ludicrous. It is difficult to introduce a new currency at the best of  times. But when the first item on the agenda of a new currency is likely  to be a substantial devaluation, the mere suggestion might be  sufficient to spark a civil war between creditors and debtors.
Given that all public as well as private-sector  debts are denominated in euros, or other hard currencies, the  introduction of a new drachma would provide little respite. It would  probably cause the domestic banking system to collapse as its assets  were devalued relative to its liabilities, and the government to default  as the international community would hardly perceive such a move as  being in its interests.
Long for Safety
The trend is actually going in the opposite  direction as small countries, whose currencies lack credibility and  stability in unregulated foreign-exchange markets, long for the safety  of a major currency with deep reserves.
Nor is the euro zone likely to expel Greece, or  any other aberrant member, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of cooked  books as the latest addition to Greek fiscal cuisine.
A more pertinent question is whether the euro  zone was wise to adopt measures to avert a Greek default. Two issues are  pre- eminent here.
First, a bailout provides a classic case of moral  hazard, both for other governments as well as for banks, which  knowingly buy high-yielding, but risky assets.
Second, even after all the political grumbling  and foot- dragging, the euro-zone governments had little option but to  bail out Greece. Such is the involvement of German, French, Austrian and  other banks in the Greek sovereign-debt market that the alternative  would have been a rescue operation of domestic euro-zone banks. The  motive was self-interest, not altruism.
Greatest Achievement
We need to consider that the European Union was  conceived as a political entity, with the primary goal of eliminating  warfare in Europe. The instruments of choice were closer integration of  national economies, and political cooperation between national  governments. Against this background, the single market has to be  regarded as the greatest achievement of the EU to date.
Less well understood is that a single market, as a  structure, can only work effectively and efficiently if supported by a  number of complementary systems. One of these is undoubtedly the single  currency and monetary union. Another is fiscal union: the public sector  is too large a participant in the economy, creating incentives that may  carry powerful externalities, to leave fiscal policy the autonomous  concern of component member states. This piece of the jig-saw is  missing.
Inevitable Phase
We need to view the current sovereign-debt  problem as a second, inevitable phase of the international financial  crisis, whose major eruption followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers  Holdings Inc. in September 2008.
At that time, the interbank market was paralyzed  due to increased credit risk and excessive leveraging, combined with an  overextending of the maturity mismatch that lies at the heart of the  financial system. The preceding decades of economic prosperity had been  wasted; budget surpluses, inflated by the boom, became instruments of  public largess or political adventurism. Cyclical correction was largely  ignored; structural problems arising from demographic change, untenable  pension systems and bloated public sectors, were confronted half-  heartedly, if at all.
The stimulus packages to inflate economies  sliding into recession, along with supportive monetary policies, were an  unavoidable policy response. For reassurance, we need look no further  than the decline in real income and the increase in unemployment in this  crisis; painful as these have been, they pale into insignificance  compared with the Great Depression. This was achieved at a cost of  growing budgetary deficits and spiraling debt ratios, but surely it is  worth the price.
Market Verdict
So why are the markets unimpressed? Why is the  market verdict unfavorable?
This is a clear vote of no confidence in the  political management and fiscal administration of our economies. The  wasted opportunities in the past; the delusion that deregulation was all  that was required to ensure prosperity; the public promotion of an  incentive structure that juxtaposed personal enrichment with the public  good and the self-laudatory conceit during the good times, are all now  coming home to roost.
It was always clear that the financial crisis  couldn’t be confined to a single market, if only because of the close  linkages between such markets when regulatory hurdles have been removed.  Once more, we must confront the issue of “too big to fail,” but this  time in relation to sovereign governments. Once more, we must consider  to what extent the European Central Bank should pump public-sector  liquidity into a market when private- sector liquidity has dried up.
Prosperity With Growth
As for fiscal policy, it is imperative to  restructure public-sector revenue and expenditure, as soon as  developments allow, in order to regain the long-term path of  sustainability. Prosperity can only come from economic growth, and this  requires that we focus on investment in education, training and  research.
We must be prepared to bite the bullet with  regard to pensions and social services, something our governments have  shown little appetite for to date. Sooner or later, we will have to stop  trying to plug every leak in the dyke, permit some flooding if  necessary, and be prepared to start again. The longer we wait, the more  our economies are likely to underperform, relative to potential, for the  foreseeable future.
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