Who invented bank deposit insurance?

I LOVE the Internet. The best Christmas present I got last year was a preview of a forthcoming book by a banker/historian in Boston. He sent me electronically his PhD thesis, a piece of masterly detective work on how ideas travel over time and space, become adopted successfully in a different place, and then comes back to where they started.

Dr Frederic Grant Jr's forthcoming book uncovered how the US bank deposit insurance system has its root in ideas borrowed from Canton (Guangdong province in southern China) of the 19th century. The origins of the US deposit insurance scheme arose from the 1828 The Safety Fund statute of the State of New York, drafted by a legislator named Joshua Forman.

In those days, if the state-authorised banks failed, the state would have to pay for their failure. Forman borrowed the idea from Canton that those authorised for privileged trade (in banks the privilege of private currency issue) should be responsible for their own debts.

The success of the New York Safety Fund inspired the adoption of similar schemes by 13 other American states. In 1933, the Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC), following the failure of many banks across the US. This idea of a national deposit insurance scheme has been adopted by many countries around the world, and is currently being considered in China.

How did Forman get the idea about the Canton Guaranty Scheme? Apparently, New York was already the major port for US-China trade and the scheme was familiar to New York businessmen.

How the Canton system evolved

It all came about because the Qing dynasty official merchants, namely merchant houses (or hongs) authorised by Beijing to conduct foreign trade, often require trade credit to conduct business with foreigners in Canton. If these traders defaulted on their loans, the foreigners threatened to take action on the weak Qing dynasty. Hence, in order to prevent individual merchant failure, the Qing government used a collective responsibility method evolved by the Manchu court in Beijing that ensured that those authorised to benefit from the foreign trade also collectively guaranteed each other's trade debt, and a premium was paid yearly into a fund to pay off any individual failure.

The Qing government solved the problem of defaults by imposing collective responsibility everyone was responsible for the group's debt. The good news is that the group as a whole made sure that no member got into trouble, engaging in what is today called “peer surveillance”. The bad news is that with collective guarantee, the smaller traders have an incentive to take higher risks, creating moral hazard private gain at collective loss. Moreover, as history showed, if trade was really bad, more traders failed and since the Qing government also borrowed or taxed the accumulated fund regularly, there were not enough money in the fund to settle all debts. Eventually the Canton Guaranty Fund also failed.

Corruption and misappropriation of fund was to blame, but the main culprit remained what Grant called “the perennial dilemma of inadequate capital and lack of access to affordable credit” for smaller hongs.

These problems plagued all deposit insurance schemes, even today. Large banks loath to support deposit insurance because they pay a larger share of the premium than smaller banks. Small banks enjoy the group insurance, but are more prone to failure because they were more likely to take more risks, which meant that there should be supervision to make sure that these riskier players do not destroy the group as a whole.

Deposit insurance worked very well in the United States, as the FDIC not only participated in supervision of the insured banks, but also engaged actively as the mortuary of failed banks. In the recent crisis, from 2009 to currently, the FDIC smoothly managed the exit of over 400 banks in the United States, without disruption to the system as a whole. But this time round, it was the failure of the shadow banks and larger banks that created the problem. Yes, smaller banks failed, but they did not take down the whole system because deposit insurance prevented large-scale bank runs at the retail level.

The time has come for China to adopt a formal deposit insurance scheme. There are at least three good reasons why it should occur. The first is that deposit insurance will help stop retail bank panic, exactly the reason for the Canton Guaranty Fund. The second is that there must be an orderly exit mechanism for financial institution failure. Some argue that a deposit insurance would duplicate supervision. Today we realise why we have two kidneys instead of one we need redundancy in the system, in case one fails.

The third, based on my personal experience, is that regulators who are good at daily operations may not always be very good at conducting the messy operations of restructuring failed banks. This is a very complicated process that needs strong skills, good bankruptcy laws and more investment banking skills than regulation. Deposit insurance is specialised work and needs specialised skills.

As Grant rightly said, the historical record of the Canton Guaranty System offers a number of valuable lessons to the modern world. “These include (1) that the tax that supports a guaranty fund must be based on measured risk of loss; (2) that the fund and its insureds must be made subject to strong independent supervision; (3) that laws enacted to avoid risk contingencies must be enforced; and (4) that both corruption and the diversion of fund assets must be strictly prohibited.”

The trouble with history is that we never seem to learn from history.

THINK ASIAN
BY ANDREW SHENG

 > Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute. 

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‘The year of shame 2012’ get any worse in 2013?

THE year 2012 has been labelled “the year of shame'' for the banking industry.

It doesn't matter that such nasty name-calling refers more to the problems at British banks.

Whatever happens in London is bound to attract world interest as it is a major financial centre vying for top spot with New York.

When scandals fall in thick, the tarnish on the banks there becomes even more significant.

To make matters worse, it is now apparent that the Libor interest rate rigging problem is more widespread than originally thought.



Source: Accounting Degree.net (click to link and enlarge)

It was not just a case of a few bad apples causing the rot, said The Guardian.

The problem was cultural, the report said, implying that it would require a wide spectrum of action to overhaul mindsets and unhealthy practices, possibly from ground level.

This requires much work on an international platform as there is no knowing how far and deep the rot has spread.

No doubt, banks in London and New York are the major players in the financial industry, and the other smaller players are feeling the heat as the ripple effect wears on.

As arrests related to the Libor rigging are ongoing, reports liken the revelations and subsequent documentation to a “blizzard.''

A blizzard is a severe snowstorm that often affects visibility, and points to very difficult weather conditions.

In banking and Libor rigging, in particular, this possibly refers to the layers of greed, conspiracy and corruption among the people responsible for conducting the trades.

Going into 2013, more arrests, fines and revelations are expected; the blizzard, therefore, is expected to be stronger.

In view of such a possible scenario, what are the central banks and other banks supposed to do to prevent any international backlash?

Not to underestimate the long-drawn effects of bank weakness, these external parties should quickly cooperate on an international basis to share information, iron out potential problems and try to prevent a big crisis from erupting.

With sound and consistent monitoring, a lot of negative effects can be pre-empted and, thus, avoided.

PLAIN SPEAKING By YAP LENG KUEN The Star

Associate editor Yap Leng Kuen wonders if it is too late to find a shield from blizzards.

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The rotten heart of capitalism: interest rate-fixing scandals

The magnitude of the banking scam must be realised and tough action taken

The UBS building in Zurich. Photograph: Michael Buholzer/Reuters



This is the year the consensus changed. Around the world, policy-makers, regulators and bankers recognised that the legacy of the 20-year credit boom up to 2008 is more corrosive than all but a few realised at the time. The bankers – and the theorists who justified their actions – made a millennial mistake. Navigating a way out of the mess was never likely to be easy, but it is made harder still by not recognising the magnitude of the disaster and the necessary radicalism involved if things are to be put right.

If there were any last doubts they were dispelled by the record $1.5bn fine paid by the Swiss bank UBS for "pervasive" and "epic" efforts to manipulate the benchmark rate of interest – Libor – at which the world's great banks lend to each other. The manipulation was at the behest of the traders who buy and sell "interest rate derivatives", whose price varies with Libor, so that cumulatively billions of pounds of profits could be made. Nor was UBS alone. What is now evident is that all the banks that made the daily market in global interest rates in 10 major currencies were doing the same to varying degrees.

There was a complete disdain for the banks' customers, for the notion of custodianship of other people's money, that was industry wide. It is hard to believe this culture has evaporated with the imposition of a fine. No banker falsifying the actual interest rates at which he or she was borrowing or lending, or trader who requested that they did so, had any sense that there is something sacred about banking – that the many billions flowing through their hands are not their own. It was just anonymous Monopoly money that gave them the opportunity to become very rich. The UBS emails, which will be used to support criminal charges, could hardly be more revealing. This was about making money from money for vast personal gain.

Interest rate derivatives are presented as highly useful if complex financial instruments – essentially bets on future interest rate movements – that allow the banks' customers better to manage the risks of unexpected movements in interest rates. Whether a multinational or a large pension fund, you can buy or sell a derivative so you will not be embarrassed if suddenly interest rates jump or fall. Bookmakers lay off bets. Interest rate derivatives allow buyers to lay off the risk that their expectations of interest rate movements might be wrong.

What makes your head reel is the size of this global market. World GDP is around $70tn. The market in interest rate derivatives is worth $310tn. The idea that this has grown to such a scale because of the demands of the real economy better to manage risk is absurd. And on top it has a curious feature. None of the banks that constitute the market ever loses money. All their divisions that trade interest rate derivatives on their own account report huge profits running into billions. Where does that profit come from?

The answer is it comes largely from you and me. Global banking, intertwined with the global financial services and asset-management industry, has emerged as a tax on the world economy, generating much activity and lending that has not been needed, but whose purpose is to make those who work in it very rich. The centre-left thinktank IPPR reports that people with identical skills earn on average 20% more in financial services than in other industries, with the premium rising the higher the seniority. That wage premium does not come from virtuous hard work or enterprise. It comes from how finance is structured to deliver excessive profit.

Scandalous

The Libor scam is an object lesson in how finance taxes the rest of the economy. Plainly, the final buyers of the mispriced interest rate derivatives could not have been other banks, otherwise they would have lost money and we know that they all made profits. In any case, they were part of the scam. The final buyers of the mispriced derivatives were their customers. Some must have been large companies, but many were those – ranging from insurance companies and pension funds to hedge funds – who manage our savings on our behalf.

Here a second scam kicks in. One of the puzzles of modern finance is why the returns to those who buy shares in public stock markets are so much lower than the profits made by the companies themselves. One of the answers is that there are so many brokers, asset managers and intermediaries along the way all taking a cut. Sometimes it is through excessive management fees, but another way is not doing honest to God investing – choosing a good company to invest in and sticking with it – but through churning people's portfolios or unnecessarily buying interest rate derivatives to protect against interest rate risk, while charging a fee for the "service". Many of those mispriced interest rate derivatives will have ended up in the investment portfolios of large insurance companies and pension funds or, more sinisterly, in the portfolios of the banks' clients.

Most rotten

Bank managements are presented as ignorant dolts, fooled by rogue traders. They were no such thing. The interest rate derivative market is many times the scale than is warranted by genuine demand precisely because it represented such an effective way of looting the rest of us. The business model of modern finance – banks trading on their own account in rigged derivative markets, skimming investment funds and manipulating interbank lending, all to underlend to innovative enterprise while overlending on a stunning scale to private equity and property – is not the result of a mistake. It represents a series of choices made over 30 years in which finance has progressively resisted any sense it has a duty of custodianship to its clients or wider responsibilities to the economy. It was capitalism allegedly at its purest. We now understand it was capitalism at its most rotten. It needs wholesale reform.

The government's proposals to ringfence investment banking from the rest of a bank's activities, following the proposals from Sir John Vickers, is a start. But it is only that. Last week, Conservative MP Andrew Tyrie's cross-party parliamentary commission proposed " electrifying" the ringfence with the threat of full separation if malpractice continues. It also considered banning banks from trading in derivatives on their own account. But while tough, the commission should extend its brief. The issue is to create a financial system in its entirety that serves individuals and business alike, makes normal profits and, above all, embeds its public duty of custodianship in the bedrock of what it does. The government fears that more upheaval will unsettle banking and business confidence. It could not be more wrong. Reform is the platform on which a genuine economic recovery will be built.

Comment by Will Hutton - Guardian
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